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Abstract The purpose of this article is to draw the attention of mathematics education
researchers to a relatively new semantic theory called inferentialism, as developed by
the philosopher Robert Brandom. Inferentialism is a semantic theory which explains
concept formation in terms of the inferences individuals make in the context of an
intersubjective practice of acknowledging, attributing, and challenging one another’s
commitments. The article argues that inferentialism can help to overcome certain
problems that have plagued the various forms of constructivism, and
socioconstructivism in particular. Despite the range of socioconstructivist positions
on offer, there is reason to think that versions of these problems will continue to haunt
socioconstructivism. The problems are that socioconstructivists (i) have not come to a
satisfactory resolution of the social-individual dichotomy, (ii) are still threatened by
relativism, and (iii) have been vague in their characterization of what construction is.
We first present these problems; then we introduce inferentialism, and finally we show
how inferentialism can help to overcome the problems. We argue that inferentialism (i)
contains a powerful conception of norms that can overcome the social-individual
dichotomy, (ii) draws attention to the reality that constrains our inferences, and (iii)
develops a clearer conception of learning in terms of the mastering of webs of reasons.
Inferentialism therefore represents a powerful alternative theoretical framework to
socioconstructivism.
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The many forms of constructivism have had significant impact on educational
theory and practice (Confrey and Kazak 2006; Ernest 1991). A key tenet of
constructivism is that knowledge cannot be transmitted in any direct way to
students; instead, they construct knowledge themselves based on their experiences
and social environment (Clements and Battista 1990). Interest in constructivism
has significantly increased in recent decades, judging from the annual number of
publications using words starting with constructivis* in the PsycINFO database
(see Fig. 1). This increase stands in contrast with the critical analysis of its
philosophical underpinnings and educational consequences (Lesh and Doerr
2003; Osborne 1996; Phillips 1995; Roth 2011). There is reason, then, to revisit
some of the critical issues given recent developments in philosophy. Bransen
(2002) has convincingly argued that inferentialism has much to offer to anyone
interested in cognitive development. This article aims to draw lessons for educa-
tional theory from inferentialism (Brandom 1994, 2000) and the broader philo-
sophical terrain to which it is connected (e.g., McDowell 1994).
Inferentialism is a semantic theory that explains concept formation in terms of
the inferences individuals make in the context of an intersubjective practice of
acknowledging, attributing, and challenging one another’s commitments. For
inferentialism, inferences cannot be understood apart from the norms that exist
in this intersubjective practice, the game of giving and asking for reasons, with
the consequence that individual reasoning cannot be understood apart from this
social, norm-laden game. Inferentialism provides an alternative characterization
to constructivism’s conception of social-individual interaction that replaces the
latter’s emphasis on construction with a focus on the role of reasoning in
learning (Bakker and Derry 2011; Hußmann and Schacht 2009; Schindler and
Hußmann 2013).
The article is structured as follows. We first introduce socioconstructivism, the
version of constructivism that in mathematics education seems to be the most accepted
one. The following three sections then discuss three problems that we think continue to
plague socioconstructivism. These are (i) its problematic conception of the relation
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between the social and the individual, (ii) its lack of an adequate account of the
objectivity or world dependence of knowledge, and (iii) the vagueness of the construc-
tivist metaphor. To overcome these problems, we introduce inferentialism as a novel
theoretical framework. We are not arguing against the pedagogy of
socioconstructivism; instead, our suggestion is that there are problems with its theoret-
ical presuppositions. We first give an introduction to inferentialism, before showing
how inferentialism supplies the tools to overcome each of the problems in the next
section. We end with a short conclusion.
What is socioconstructivism?
The term Bconstructivism^ covers a wide and growing range of theories and
standpoints. In this article, we limit ourselves to what seems to be the most widely
accepted version of constructivism in mathematics education: socioconstructivism.
However, where our arguments apply more broadly, we will direct them at con-
structivism generally. In order to make it clear what we understand by
socioconstructivism, we will briefly characterize the main tenets of a typical
socioconstructivist position. We aim to illustrate that socioconstructivist positions
share two broad orientations. First, they take an intermediate position between
cognitive constructivism and sociocultural theories. And second, they combine
the elements of these two research traditions in a pragmatic manner. These two
orientations, which we will now begin to explain, are sufficient to lay
socioconstructivism open to the problems that we describe in the next three
sections.
Socioconstructivism was originally developed as a response to a perceived
tension between the way the social and individual aspects of learning were
theorized (Ernest 1991; Lerman 1996; Steffe and Gale 1995). Socioconstructivism
was intended to overcome a dichotomy that many scholars saw between the
theoretical perspectives of cognitive constructivism on one hand and sociocultural
theories on the other. At its basis, this dispute centers on what constructivist
education theorists ought to take to be the primary unit of analysis: the individual
or the social. On one extreme, cognitive constructivists, in a neo-Kantian tradition
(e.g., Von Glasersfeld 1980), postulated that a constructivist account of learning
need only explain the process of learning in terms of the individual’s construction
of internal knowledge or meaning. This approach concerns itself with the individ-
ual’s internal cognitive mechanisms and the role they play in helping the learners
to make sense of their world. This particular version of constructivism has been
influenced by the work of Piaget, who posited a detailed account of the relation
between the activity of children and the conception and adjustment of their
individual conceptual schemes (Piaget 1970). Whether or not correct (Cole and
Wertsch 1996; Confrey 1995; Kitchener 2009), this approach was thought to
overemphasize the role of individuals at the cost of their social context and to
neglect aspects of learning that were not solely cognitive. In response, some
scholars, inspired by Vygotsky (1978), took an opposed position by making the
social embedding of learning the primary unit of analysis in place of individual
learners’ independent constructive activity (Lerman 1996; Mason 2007). Cobb and
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Bowers (1999, p. 5) delineate the tension that arose between these two construc-
tivist approaches by considering two metaphors:
In the case of the cognitive perspective, a central organizing metaphor is that of
knowledge as an entity that is acquired in one task and conveyed to other task
settings. In contrast, a primary metaphor of the situated learning perspective is
that of knowledge as an activity that is situated with regard to an individual’s
position in the world of social affairs.
This difference in approach has led to a tension in constructivist literature, because,
BIf from the cognitive point of view, knowing means possessing, from the sociocultural
perspective it means belonging, participating, and communicating^ (Mason 2007, p. 2).
In this sense, the focus in constructivist literature had been either on the Bconstruction
of internal knowledge or meaning^ or on the Bconstruction [...] of new communities of
discourse and social practice^ (Kaartinen and Kumpulainen 2002). This is unsatisfac-
tory, because educational theory should surely aim to do justice to both the individual
and the social aspects of learning.
Cobb (1994) gave an important impetus to the socioconstructivist program when he
argued that these two different perspectives were not contrary to each other but, instead,
were complementary. He advocated a Bpragmatic^ approach which allowed teachers
and educationalists to freely combine elements from both perspectives in order to suit
their needs. In their seminal paper, Cobb et al. (1992) formulated a socioconstructivist
position that was intended to overcome the cognitive-sociocultural divide in this
pragmatic manner. Their proposal was to
treat people in general and mathematics teachers and students in particular as
active constructors of their ways of knowing and as participants in social practices
[...]. Knowing would then be seen as a matter of being able to participate in
mathematical practices in the course of which one can appropriately explain and
justifying [sic] one’s actions. (Cobb et al. 1992, p. 15)
Cobb et al., instead of focusing only on the individual’s constructive activity, situate
this activity in its social context. They do this by describing it in terms of participation
in communal Bways of knowing.^ In order to avoid postulating a problematic relation-
ship between the student’s ideas and an external reality that is independent of human
beings, they describe knowledge rather in terms of submitting Btaken-as-shared^
mathematical constructions in a social practice. In this way, individual mathematical
cognition—in the sense of the individual’s acquisition of mathematical understand-
ing—is given a social interpretation.
Another example of what we consider to be a representative socioconstructivist
position was set out by Vosniadou (2007). Vosniadou’s text has the added advantage of
being explicitly presented as a middle way between what she calls the Bcognitive^ and
the Bsituative^ perspectives on conceptual change, which correspond to our cognitive
and sociocultural perspectives, respectively. Vosniadou argues for Ballowing the possi-
bility of objectifying knowledge while considering knowledge acquisition to result
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from participation in sociocultural activities^ (Vosniadou 2007, p. 55). In other words,
she keeps in place the general cognitivist understanding of knowledge acquisition as a
process of theory construction but grounds this process of acquisition in a social
context. Vosniadou endorses what she calls Bthe framework theory approach to con-
ceptual change,^ which takes learning to result from the development and restructuring
of Bnaïve, intuitive, domain-specific theories constructed on the basis of everyday
experience^ in both a top-down and a bottom-up manner (Vosniadou 2007, p. 58).
Many other versions of socioconstructivism exist, and it sometimes appears as if
there is no clear consensus regarding the meaning of the term. For our purposes, we
reiterate that we consider a position to be a socioconstructivist one if it incorporates
elements from both the cognitive constructivist and the sociocultural traditions (and if
this has been done in a pragmatic way). Having set out our understanding of
socioconstructivism, we are now ready to begin considering three enduring problems
for socioconstructivism.
The social-individual dichotomy in socioconstructivism
The first and to our mind most important problem is that, despite the fact that
socioconstructivism was explicitly developed to resolve the dichotomy between
individual-centric and social-centric approaches to learning, there remains a widespread
feeling that it has failed to do this (e.g., Van Oers 2006). Educational theory is still
divided by a social-individual dichotomy that dictates both the theory and the practice
of education (Akkerman et al. 2007; diSessa 2008; Mason 2007; Mercer 2007). The
dichotomy is kept in place by the large differences in the underlying epistemological
and metaphorical orientations of the cognitive and sociocultural approaches (Cobb and
Bowers 1999; Sfard 1998). Because of this, the question has arisen whether these
approaches are simply too disjoint to be reconciled. Will any modification of them be
sufficient to adequately theorize both the social and individual aspects of learning (as
we should surely attempt to do)?
We would like to consider briefly how the social-individual dichotomy remains
unresolved in Cobb et al.’s (1992) article, which we previously cited as an eminent
example of a socioconstructivist position (even if it did not yet have that label). Then,
we show how the main lines of our criticism of Cobb et al.’s paper apply equally to
other socioconstructivist positions. But our argument is not only negative, for we end
this section by briefly considering Cobb and Yackel’s (1996) attempt to overcome the
dichotomy through the introduction of sociomathematical norms, an attempt that we
think makes important steps forward.
We previously described Cobb et al.’s position as involving the situating of indi-
viduals’ constructive activity in a participationist social context. However, is this really
sufficient to overcome the social-individual dichotomy? There are reasons to think that
it is not, because it is unclear what it would take to overcome this dichotomy. We
suggest the following criterion: a theory overcomes the social-individual dichotomy if it
can describe the learning activity of the student simultaneously and essentially in both
cognitive and social terms. By Bsimultaneously and essentially,^ we mean that the
theory should be able to describe the activity in such a way that both its social and its
cognitive aspects are inseparably connected to it—in other words, the activity would
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not be what it was unless it had both social and cognitive aspects. To use philosophical
terminology, these aspects must be Binternally related^: If either aspect were to be
removed, the activity would cease to be. It is not enough, then, for the activity to have
both a social and an individual aspect, if it is constituted such that these aspects are not
internally related (so that, conceivably, the social or the individual aspect could exist in
isolation from the other).
Do Cobb et al. succeed in describing learning activity as simultaneously and
essentially both social and cognitive? We believe they do not. For Cobb et al.,
intersubjectivity turns upon the fact that interpretations of mathematical objects
are taken as shared—that is to say, they are not correct in an absolutely objective
(realist) manner, but their correctness is based only upon the fact that these
interpretations are agreed to be shared by the different participants in the practice,
with no way of verifying in an absolute manner whether they are really correct.
Here, we do not want to consider the correctness of these interpretations (for this,
see the next section), but only the psychological process by which they are
constructed, that is, the process of learning. If we consider this process, it becomes
clear that Cobb et al. continue to ascribe to the learner, in the tradition of the
cognitive constructivists, an ability to construct interpretations of mathematical
objects in isolation from her social environment. For it is only when these
interpretations already exist that they can begin to be taken as shared. For Cobb
et al., sociality is instituted by the individual subjects’ taking each others’ inter-
pretations of certain problems as shared. Cobb et al. take it that the rejection of the
idea that knowledge answers to a reality that is independent of human beings
entails that there can be no objective basis for intersubjective agreement, as there
is Bno way of knowing whether [students’] individual interpretations of a situation
actually correspond to those of others^ (p. 17), and this, in turn, they take to lead
to the view that there is no principled basis for intersubjective agreement at all
outside of the pragmatic assumption of shared interpretations. Intersubjectivity is
erected on top of individual interpretations and because of this is in a sense still
posterior to the constructive activity of the individual. This keeps the social-
individual dichotomy in place.
Cobb et al. do not show why the individual aspect of learning is bound by the
social aspect, beyond the fact that observations seems to confirm that it functions
that way in practice (Beach 1995; Bowers 1996). For Cobb et al., individual
learners have Btaken-as-shared mathematical interpretations, meanings, and prac-
tices institutionalized by wider society^ (p. 16), but there still appears to be an
assumption that the individual operates on her own such that individual interpre-
tations come first and social ratification becomes something of a by-product of
collective individual interpretative activity. While the process of learning has both
individual and social aspects for Cobb et al., the individual dimension remains the
basis upon which the social dimension emerges (cf. Radford and Roth 2011). In
this way, Cobb et al., like the radical cognitive constructivists, continue to hold on
to the idea of an autonomous subject who is able to construct interpretations of
mathematical relations in total isolation from her social environment. The social
aspects come only later, when the individual interpretations are shared. In this
way, the social and the individual aspects of learning, though both are given a
place in the wider theory, are still only externally and not internally related.
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We believe that this problem, that the individual and the social aspects of learning,
while both accounted for, are kept apart to some extent, is widespread in
socioconstructivism. We also find it in Vosniadou’s (2007) framework theory of con-
ceptual change. Vosniadou, like Cobb et al., accommodates social aspects of learning,
but at the core of her theory is still the individual’s ability to construct theories. Although
the social environment has an impact on the content of the theories that are developed, it
does not impact this theory-forming ability itself. Such a perspective cannot satisfy our
overcoming criterion, because by its very nature, it takes the social and individual
aspects of learning to be externally and coincidentally, rather than internally, related.
It is worth asking what it would take to effect a genuine overcoming of the
social-individual dichotomy. Here, we want to discuss one example that we think
moves in the right direction. Cobb and Yackel (1996) introduce the concept of
Bsociomathematical norms^ into their analysis of classroom interactions. These
norms Bcharacterize regularities in communal or collective classroom activity and
are considered to be jointly established by the teachers and students as members of
the classroom community^ (p. 178). They explicitly note that Bneither the social
norms nor the individual students’ beliefs are given primacy over the other^ (p.
178). Sociomathematical norms are social norms that relate to the teaching of
mathematics, for example, Bwhat counts as a different mathematical solution, a
sophisticated mathematical solution, an efficient mathematical solution, and an
acceptable mathematical solution^ (p. 178).
Sociomathematical norms constitute an ontological innovation (diSessa and Cobb
2004) that is reducible neither to the sociocultural nor the cognitive traditions while
containing both social and individual aspects. As such, it stands a chance of bringing
together the theoretical presuppositions of both of these traditions in a single theoretical
tool. It also sets sociomathematical norms apart from attempts to integrate social
aspects into a fundamentally individual cognitive process or vice versa. We will have
much more to say about norms in what follows. For now, we suggest that Cobb and
Yackel’s use of norms was not in itself enough to overcome the social-individual
dichotomy, because it was still only a part of a broader socioconstructivist attempt to
bring the social and cognitive theoretical traditions in sync (see Cobb and Yackel 1996,
pp. 459–60). However, from our position, it appears that the notion could have been
more successfully applied if it had been given a more central role in the overall theory.
In sum, it is true that socioconstructivist theories cover both the individual and
the social aspects of learning. However, they do not reconcile the parts of their
theories that are devoted to these two aspects. This often lends their theories a
slightly two-sided appearance, as if they theorize not one but two individuals: a
Bcognitive^ individual, modeled on (radical) constructivism, and a Bsocial^ indi-
vidual, modeled on sociocultural theories. This would not be a big problem if it
did not mean that, by failing to reconcile the two theories, socioconstructivists
also fail to remedy the flawed presuppositions of these theories. In particular, the
part of socioconstructivism devoted to the cognitive individual is still a funda-
mentally isolated individual, to whom, moreover, a fundamentally unconstrained
power of construction is ascribed. It is this that underlies the widespread percep-
tion that socioconstructivism has not overcome the social-individual dichotomy.
However, it appears that a successful overcoming of the social-individual dichot-
omy may be effected by giving a central role to intersubjective norms.
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The danger of relativism
A further difficulty for constructivist positions is the question of objectivity (Osborne
1996). To put it succinctly, the central concern is that if all knowledge derives from
individual interpretations, we seem to have sacrificed the possibility of objectivity and
risk running into the specter of relativism (cf. Boghossian 2006). In some more extreme
versions of constructivism, talk of objectivity is rejected in favor of pragmatic notions
such as viability (Von Glasersfeld 1980). In Cobb et al. (1992), the main metaphor for
knowledge is that of Bmathematical ways of knowing^ (p. 10), that is, ways of
participating in a mathematical social context. Objectivity, on this approach, is assumed
to derive from two factors, namely the individual’s interpretive activity and her
participation in a community of learners.
Many constructivists reject the notion of objective knowledge because they believe
that it implies a direct relationship to a world that is outside of human culture and
activity, something which they believe to be impossible (Confrey 1995; Wertsch 1985).
Yet, it has been argued that such positions continue to misconceive the relation between
mind and world and, in fact, implicitly accept the idea they claim to be attacking (Derry
2013). The reason for this is that these positions respond to the perceived impossibility
of a genuine mind-world relationship by rejecting the Bworld^ side of this relation
entirely and trying to reconstruct a notion of reality on the basis of concepts on the
Bmind^ side of the equation only (such as internal constructions, social interactions,
etc.). However, there are good reasons to think that such a one-sided elimination cannot
be made to work. For one, such positions run the risk of a misplaced individualism that
has the individual learner developing her interpretations Bin a void^ (McDowell 1994,
p. 11). This could also lead to a culturally relativistic account of learning—for example,
one in which a particularly recalcitrant community could be justified in constructing
1 + 1 = 3 as a piece of mathematical reasoning.
More fundamentally, however, insofar as they reject the world-related aspects of
knowledge, constructivists lose sight of an important dimension of knowledge
(McDowell 1994). The problem is not that of accommodating a direct mind-world
link that can support a theory of objectivity. Instead, the worry is that constructivists
cannot give a role in their theories to reality itself. It appears that for constructivists, the
world that we inhabit is no longer a source of knowledge. Rather, knowledge derives
solely from individuals’ interpretations or social interactions. Although the world may
have various forms of impact on our thinking according to constructivists, it does so
only through the mediation of our individual interpretations. It is natural, however, to
think that our reasoning has to be answerable to the world itself, and constructivists
accordingly face the challenge of finding room for this answerability.
What is constructed?
The third and final problem for constructivism relates to the constructivist metaphor.
Evidently, the claim that learning activity takes place through construction of some sort
is central to all forms of constructivism. But how does this process take place precisely,
and what is its outcome? As Van Oers (2006, pp. 116–7) has pointed out, many
constructivists are unclear about this: Bthey tend to use ‘construction’ as an explanatory
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concept without having a clear explanation of the nature of this process itself. […]
Instead of using ‘construction’ as an explanatory concept, ‘construction’ is above all the
concept to be explained.^
In our discussion of the social-individual dichotomy, we have already noted that the
process of construction for socioconstructivists often remains an individualistic proce-
dure that is unconstrained by outside sources. In this way, an autonomous ability to
construct his or her own understanding is ascribed to the student. But, as we have seen
above, it is questionable whether the student really possesses such an ability, not least
because students grow up in a social environment on which they depend for their
cognitive development. Radford and Roth (2011) have argued that describing the
activity of learning in terms of construction and related metaphors such as
Bnegotiation,^ Btaken as shared,^ and Bway of knowing^ implicitly carries with it an
individualistic perspective that denies the impact of the social except insofar as it
impacts inner construction from the outside.
There are other problems with the metaphor besides its individualism, however.
Most importantly, there is widespread confusion over what it is that is constructed
precisely. Suggestions range from Binterpretations^ and ways of knowing, as in Cobb
et al. (1992) and others, to Btheories^ as in Vosniadou (2007), to, for instance,
Bknowledge^ itself (Scardamalia and Bereiter 2006) or other kinds of socially con-
structed forms of cognition or understanding. The widespread socioconstructivist
vacillation on such a crucial issue seems to betray a deeper uncertainty about what
the process of construction is precisely and how it takes place.
Let us illustrate this claim by considering one of the suggestions just mentioned, that
of Cobb et al. (1992), in slightly greater detail. Cobb et al. take it that what is
constructed is individual students’ interpretations of a given subject matter. They also
refer to conceptual schemes as outcomes of constructive activity. It appears that a
conceptual scheme is the larger mosaic in which a given interpretation must find its
place: BThe experienced naturalness of certain mathematical interpretations is relative
to the taken-as-shared conceptual schemes that we have each actively constructed in the
course of our mathematical acculturation.^ A further term, which specifies the end goal
of teaching, is mathematical way of knowing. Cobb et al. continue the previous quote:
As a consequence, we would not characterize teaching as an activity in which we
attempt to focus students’ attention on things we see in their environment in
increasingly explicit ways. Instead, we would view it as an activity in which we
guide students’ constructive efforts, thereby initiating them into taken-as-shared
mathematical ways of knowing. (p. 10)
It would seem that such a way of knowing is a conceptual scheme (or something like
it) that has proven useful with respect to a given subject matter. Because it must be
taken as shared, it appears to be an individual phenomenon in the first instance. It is
unclear if the knowing in question can be reached by an individual (for example,
because the way of knowing consistently delivers a pragmatically good solution to
problems) or whether it requires intersubjective validation to count as knowing. What is
clear, however, is that the way of knowing must be primarily a subjective state, given
that it must be taken as shared.
Inferentialism as an alternative
These three central terms—interpretation, conceptual scheme, and way of know-
ing—explain little unless supplemented by an account of how they work in connection
to actual constructive activity. Cobb et al., however, do not specify how the terms hang
together and spend few words on explicating them individually in their original paper.
Although they do characterize individual construction as involving intersubjective
aspects, still it seems that they simply assume that individuals possess such a capacity
to construct interpretations without argument. To some extent, this may reflect episte-
mological considerations: Given that interpretations are private, it is not possible to
directly observe them; thus, Cobb et al. speak of Bthe inferred quality of the children’s
experiences^ (p. 19; emphasis added). We do not question these epistemological
presuppositions. But in order to circumvent a number of ambiguities, it should be
made clear, for example, in which different forms the capacity to construct interpreta-
tions might manifest itself, to what extent the construction of an individual interpreta-
tion requires explicit forethought by the student, and whether or not explicit consider-
ation of the interpretation is required for it to be applied to a given problem. These
questions ought to be answered not just to attain a systematic and rigorous theory but
also because important aspects of the socioconstructivist’s theory of mind would
otherwise remain unclear. Progress on questions like these is necessary for Cobb
et al.’s position, but also, we think, for other socioconstructivist positions, if they are
to come to a more satisfactory description and explanation of the learning process.
Introducing inferentialism
Having set out three enduring problems for socioconstructivism, we now consider the
theoretical framework of inferentialism that we put forward as an alternative.
Inferentialism is a philosophical theory that explains the nature of language in terms
of its role in reasoning (see Derry this issue). The meaning of words is explained in
terms of their use in social practices. It was developed by the philosopher Robert
Brandom (1994, 2000), and this article draws upon his work. However, Brandom’s
ideas were developed in a context that includes predecessors such as Sellars (Sellars
1997) and contemporaries such as McDowell (McDowell 1994), to whom we will
occasionally appeal as a way of clarifying Brandom’s ideas. Naturally, we can give only
a brief introduction to inferentialism here. We refer interested readers to Brandom’s
own introduction to his work (Brandom 2000) and to Bransen (2002).
The key idea of inferentialism is that concepts should be understood in terms of their
inferential connections (Bakker and Derry 2011). For example, the meaning of
Btriangle,^ for Brandom, depends on the fact that one can, inter alia, derive Bp’s three
angles are equal to two right angles^ or Bp is not a circle^ from Bp is a triangle,^ but not
Bp has four sides.^ The inferences one can and cannot make on the basis of a given
claim articulate what that claim means. So, in learning new inferences that can be made
on the basis of Bp is a triangle,^ one is learning more about the meaning of triangle.
Some important features of inferentialism can already be derived from this simple
example. For one, it follows that inferentialism endorses semantic holism. That is, it
must claim that one cannot learn a concept in one fell swoop; rather, as one becomes
gradually familiar with more of the inferences the concept is engaged in, one becomes
more familiar with the concept as well. Every concept is related by inferences to other
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concepts (triangle, for example, is related to Bangle^ and Bside^), and one only knows
the concept if one is able to make at least some of these inferences correctly. Brandom
writes that Bone cannot have any concepts unless one has many concepts^ (Brandom
2000, p. 15).
Second, because inferences are the rational connections between concepts, it follows
that inferentialism emphasizes the role of reasoning (that is, inference-making) in
language use. Knowing a concept is being able to reason with it. Perhaps this sounds
like a strong and counterintuitive claim at first, as though a thinking process should
underlie the use of every word. However, as we explain below, Brandom sees reasoning
as primarily a social process of exteriorized linguistic moves, which allows him to
develop a much more fine-grained account of reasoning.
The key to this more detailed understanding of reasoning is that Brandom describes
the activity of reasoning in terms of a process of social assessment. To see this, it is
important to understand the role that (social) norms play in his theory. Brandom
couples an inferentialist semantics to a normative pragmatics—that is, he combines
an inferentialist conception of the content of concepts with a normative conception of
concept use. Inferentialism begins from a conception of social life as pervaded by
norms of correctness. In daily life, we humans navigate these norms in all that we do.
Reasoning, too, is subject to norms of correctness. Inferences can be correctly or
incorrectly made. The inference from Bp is an equilateral triangle^ to Bp contains a
right angle,^ for example, is an incorrect one.
Brandom explains reasoning in terms of social activity broadly in the following way.
He conceives of this social activity in terms of a language game in Wittgenstein’s sense,
though more fundamental. Wittgenstein (1953, §18) famously denied language to have
a Bdowntown^—a central language game which is fundamental to all others. For
Brandom, however, there is such a downtown: namely, the practice of reason-giving
through making assertions. Brandom (2000, p. 189) calls this fundamental linguistic
activity the game of giving and asking for reasons. This game consists of the exchange
of claims between interlocutors. Normativity is important in this game in that the
correctness of what one says in it depends on the reactions of one’s interlocutors and
one’s reaction to those reactions. Others may play a significant role in determining
whether what one says is correct. For example, if I first say Bp is an equilateral triangle^
and then Bp contains a 90 degree angle,^ it is up to others to ask for reasons supporting
the claim, which in this case will in effect lead them to sanction me for saying two
incompatible things.
Brandom (1994, Chapter 3) develops a wide-ranging and detailed theory that
describes the different normative relations that exist in the game of giving and asking
for reasons. In outline, the theory is that interlocutors in the game of giving and asking
for reasons keep track of each other’s utterances in a process that Brandom metaphor-
ically calls deontic scorekeeping. That is, they keep track of the commitments that each
makes by Bkeeping score^ of what utterances each of them is allowed or not allowed to
make (in line with the general meaning of Bdeontic^ as Brelating to duty and
obligation^). When someone says something, this is taken as the expression of a
commitment. Saying Bp is a triangle^ commits me to the thought that p is a triangle.
In order to converse in the first place, my interlocutor has to keep track of whether I am
also entitled to make the claims I make, that is, what other claims I am allowed or not
allowed to make based on the claims I have made until now. I may not be entitled to Bp
Inferentialism as an alternative
is a triangle^ for several reasons: for example, because I have just said that p has four
sides, or because I have not constructed or seen p yet, or because p is not, in fact (as you
but not I know), a triangle, etc. Scorekeeping is following whether my several claims
are warranted and assessing my behavior in light of whether it connects rationally to my
sayings. Of course, the detailed account here is not consciously recognized when we
converse with each other, but it is intended to describe the ways in which we make
sense of our interlocutor’s utterances in dialog. In dialog, rather than automatically
responding to an utterance, we are in effect keeping track of what we each are
committing ourselves to and what entitlements follow from our commitments.
The upshot of this theory is that it allows us to give a detailed account of how reason
operates in the essentially social game of giving and asking for reasons. In interactions,
people test their inferences and their commitments and in this way are able to expand or
alter their understanding of the words they use. Because the status of their utterances
develops in the context of how they are assessed by others, it is not necessary that an
explicit thought process underlies every piece of activity; rather, acts are rational if they
make sense to others in connection with the other commitments of the agent. In this
way, reasoning is made to be essentially social. At the same time, reason is essential to
engaging in the game of giving and asking for reasons, and the social practices that
humans engage in should be assessed, according to inferentialism, from the perspective
of their rationality. Also, the presence of an interlocutor in basic activity in the game of
giving and asking for reason ensures that the individual speaker encounters friction:
Her utterances cannot be explained as purely free constructive activity but are actual-
ized in light of how they are received by the interlocutor. The individual’s activity
cannot be explained outside of the context of participation with others.
A final concept that needs to be introduced is the space of reasons. Sellars, who is
one of Brandom’s inspirations, had written that
[I]n characterizing an episode or a state as that of knowing, we are not giving an
empirical description of that episode or state; we are placing it in the logical space
of reasons, of justifying and being able to justify what one says. (Sellars 1997,
§36; his italics)
The space of reasons is the space that one is initiated into when one learns how to
think, that is, to engage in the game of giving and asking for reasons. It is worth
emphasizing that the fact that knowing can be explained in terms of the space of
reasons means that what is involved in knowing is not the subject’s ability to construct
internal representations which mirror the external world. It is rather the acquisition of a
practical mastery over the use of a concept in the game of giving and asking for
reasons. Knowing a certain concept is being able to place it in the inferentially
structured space of reasons:
To grasp or understand […] a concept is to have practical mastery over the
inferences it is involved in – to know, in the practical sense of being able to
distinguish (a kind of know-how), what follows from the applicability of a
concept, and what it follows from. (Brandom 2000, p. 48, original emphasis)
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In this way, inferentialism explains the rational use of words in terms of activity in a
social practice, namely the game of giving and asking for reasons. Reasoning, which is
responding to norms and inferences within the space of reasons, is explained in terms of
this mastery.
Inferentialist resolution of the problems
In this final section, it remains for us to convey the value of inferentialism by indicating
how it can overcome the socioconstructivist problems.
The social-individual dichotomy: norms
Cognitive activity is irreducibly both social and individual in inferentialism. For
inferentialism, the most basic form of cognitive activity takes place in cooperation,
in the game of giving and asking for reasons. This means that for inferentialism,
intersubjectivity is inherent in the reasoning process (Schacht and Huβmann
2015). (This is a main point of consensus among the neo-Hegelian theories of
which inferentialism is one example; see, for example, Pinkard 1994; McDowell
1994). Only in giving and asking for reasons for one’s beliefs can one develop
one’s beliefs and learn more about them. In inferentialism, a social context is not
constructed by a collection of individuals who assume a shared understanding;
rather, the individual only comes to exist as a rational being through being
inducted into the social space of reasons. It is because individuals learn to
cooperate with each other and to hold each other responsible for their claims in
the game of giving and asking for reasons that intersubjectivity is established. The
establishment of intersubjectivity does not depend on a prior agreement; rather, it
consists purely in pragmatically coming to act together. The idea is that speakers
can implicitly hold each other accountable in the way required for participation in
the game of giving and asking for reasons long before they even gain the ability to
explicitly say that they hold each other accountable in this manner. So, the idea of
inferentialism is that it is at the level of pragmatic cooperation, rather than at the
higher level of agreement, that we need as educators to examine concept use. A
postulation of shared understanding would not make sense on an inferentialist
picture, precisely because inferentialism rejects as impossible the independence of
thought and its articulation in language. It is only on the basis of an intersubjective
context that thinking could take place at all—a view in line with Vygotsky’s ideas
(Bakhurst 2011; Derry 2008, 2013; Sfard 2008).
It is because inferentialism places norms at the heart of human experience that
it can avoid the social-individual dichotomy. If we consider the fine structure of
rational activity in inferentialism, we see that to the taking up of every normative
commitment, there corresponds some reason or inference. That is to say, every
reason depends on a social context if it is to be uttered or understood. There are no
reasons in the absence of others with whom to discuss, share, or establish them in
the first place. The cognitive and the social are therefore internally related in
inferentialism, in the sense which we have attempted to define above in our
discussion of the social-individual dichotomy.
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The danger of relativism: the game of giving and asking for reasons
As was discussed above, the danger of relativism is that constructivism must
attempt to find a place for reality in its conception of the learning process. Here,
too, inferentialism has relevant insights. Brandom, like constructivists, holds that
our access to the world is always mediated through our practices. This is because
the correctness of our claims is always up to our interlocutors in the game of
giving and asking for reasons. However, unlike constructivists, Brandom gives an
account of objectivity as well.
Brandom holds that our knowledge claims are answerable to things in the world
themselves, despite their being subject to intersubjective normative standards. In brief,
this is because, when talking about a triangle, we are purporting to talk about this actual
triangle. Even though this claim depends on intersubjective norms both for its correctness
and even for its fundamental intelligibility, this does not change the fact that when it is
spoken, it has to be assessed depending on whether it correctly speaks of the triangle. That
is to say, it is not enough that what the person says about the triangle corresponds with the
beliefs other people have about this triangle; instead, it has to correspond with the actual
properties of the triangle. By distinguishing between these two different modes of
discourse (talk about beliefs and talk about what these beliefs are about), Brandom
accommodates the world relatedness of the commitments of participants in the game of
giving and asking for reasons. This is despite the fact that inferentialism is primarily
intended to be a semantic and not a metaphysical theory. (For more details about
Brandom’s theory of objectivity, see Brandom 1994, Chapter 8; see also Bransen 2002).
What matters is that Brandom’s innovative conception of a social practice, the game
of giving and asking for reasons, is such that, despite its being inherently social and
based on a pragmatic conception of reasoning and justification, it can still assign an
important role to the objectivity and world relatedness of our knowledge claims. In this
way, inferentialism shows that the idea that our knowledge claims are constrained by
the real world is not incompatible with a rigorous insistence that these claims can exist
only in a social context (Derry 2013).
The inferentialist metaphor: reasons and mastering
Finally, inferentialism replaces socioconstructivism’s emphasis on the construction of
interpretations with an emphasis on the making and exchanging of reasons. For
inferentialism, when students learn a concept, this means that they are learning how
to use that concept in making inferences. They are mastering that part of the space of
reasons in which the concept is embedded. These reasons and this space are not so
much constructed as they are encountered and navigated in the course of classroom
activity. Because reasoning, on the inferentialist picture, is always already a social
process, it has no place for an individual constructive activity, even if that activity looks
to be individually executed. An inferentialist analysis of learning will be focused on the
reasons that underlie students’ activities, which can be expressed in commitments,
actions, or norms. Inferentialism is a philosophical theory without any claims on
psychology. Several researchers are currently at work to develop inferential analyses
of learning (Bakker and Derry 2011; Hußmann and Schacht 2009; Schindler and
Hußmann 2013).
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It is worth noting that just as the cognitive and sociocultural perspectives each have
their corresponding metaphorical frameworks, as was famously argued by Sfard
(1998), so inferentialism also brings with it its own metaphorical framework. This is
the framework of mastering (Taylor et al. submitted). Mastering is the process whereby
learners come to grasp practices, including reasoning practices, and hence concepts. By
learning to make the correct inferences and exhibit the correct patterns of behavior, they
are mastering the reasons and norms that are implicit in these reasoning practices.
Mastering, therefore, combines aspects from both the acquisition and the participation
metaphors of learning into a new metaphorical framework.
Conclusion
This article has put forward inferentialism as a powerful theory for mathematics
education researchers. We have argued that constructivism, including
socioconstructivism, is plagued by a number of recurring problems that inferentialism
can overcome. Inferentialism’s emphasis on reasoning and norms and its conceptual-
ization of the social aspects of these phenomena are powerful supplements to
socioconstructivism.
Socioconstructivism continues to develop and will find new ways of attempting to
overcome the problems that we have noted. We have not attempted a comprehensive
analysis of all socioconstructivist positions due to limits of space. However, if the
analysis of this article is correct, there is reason for thinking that these evolutions will
continue to be plagued by the problems that we have noted, such as the separation of
individual and community and the threat of relativism that is due to insufficient
attention to the external world. Inferentialism, which does give these issues due
attention and which in many ways develops an alternative perspective on concepts,
can be considered to offer more powerful theoretical resources. Although there is much
to be said for the further development of socioconstructivist positions, it has been the
purpose of this paper to argue that, in this case, inferentialism offers the possibility of
revising some of the long-held assumptions of socioconstructivism concerning the
nature of individual meaning-making and the social. In this way, inferentialism repre-
sents an alternative theoretical framework to socioconstructivism.
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